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where the occupier has reason to know that they may be present. All
entrants, whether or not foreseeable, will be owed a duty of reasonable
care where the occupier discovers, or should have discovered their
presence. In the court's own words:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection
by the law ... because he has come upon the land of another
without permission or with permission but without a business
purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their con-
duct depending upon such matters .... 5
RICHARD P. LASKO
COMPENSATION FOR THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO NAVIGABLE WATERS
The Constitution of the United States' and the constitutions of
most states2 provide that private property shall not be taken 3 for
public use without just compensation. Two basic situations have
arisen where a landowner claims to have been deprived of his right
of access to navigable waters as a result of state action. If the govern-
ment should condemn only the waterfront area of a parcel of land,
cutting off the access to the water, the landowner might claim that
he is entitled not only to the value of the land taken but also to the
value of the right of access to the water.4 In this context, the right
of access is the landowner's right of ingress and egress, or his ability
to get in and out of the water.5 However, should a bridge be con-
"443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
1U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
'E.g., ALA. CONST. art. 12 § 235; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2 § 17; ARK. CONsr. art. 2,
§ 22; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; COLO. CONsT. art. 11, § 15; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § II;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 13; MINN. CONST.
art. i, § 13; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 17; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 26; MONT. CONsT. art.
III, § 14; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22; VA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 58.
3Many state constitutions use the wording "taken or damaged." E.g., ARIZ.
CONsT. art. 2, § 17; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13; MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 14; VA. CONST. art IV, § 58.
'See Yates v. City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (io Wall.) 497 (1870). Thoughout this
comment several terms will be mentioned: (I) right of access (2) right of ingress
and egress (3) right of access to the main body of water (4) right of navigation.
All of the courts which recognize a private right of access include the right of
ingress and egress within this private right. Most of these courts do not extend
the private right to include access to the main body of water. They exclude this
by calling it the right of navigation which is a public right and therefore not one
which needs to be compensated when taken.
'E.g., Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, io8 So. 2d Pi8 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 2o Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct.
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structed over a river so that the ships of an upriver landowner cannot
get through, the landowner, while not losing his right of ingress and
egress, might claim that he is deprived of his right of access to the
main body of water and thus to the commerce of the world. While
most courts recognize that the right of access includes a right of
ingress and egress, there has been a reluctance to extend it to include
access to the main body of water.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky was recently called upon to
decide what approach it would follow in determining if the right of
access to the main body of water is compensable. In Commonwealth
v. Thomas, the condemnees owned a lakefront development tract
of approximately eighteen acres, the west side of which fronted on
Barkley Lake. The state took 1.87 acres for a new road which left a
section of approximately 0.75 acre on the west side of the condemnees'
land between the road and the lake. The north side of the condemnees'
land fronted on an inlet. A high earthen fill was placed across the
inlet such that the portion of the condemnees' land on the north side
had no access to Barley Lake. Thus the condemnees were not com-
pletely cut off from their access to Barkley Lake but only so on the
north side. Yet, on the north side, they were not deprived of their
access to the inlet in front of their property, only of their previous
access to Barkley Lake from the north side. This caused about sixteen
acres or over ninety per cent of their land to be cut off from Barkley
Lake. (See Figure I). The state appealed from a judgment which
awarded the condemnees damages for their right of access. The Ken-
tucky Court recognized that many jurisdictions had denied compen-
sation on similar facts but decided that: "[R]iparian landowners have
the right of a reasonable access to the entire body of water on which
their land borders; that such a right has value; and that before the
state may take or impair such right, it must pay the owner just com-
pensation therefor.' ' 7 Policy factors were the key considerations in
the court's decision. Kentucky, as a result of dam construction projects,
had more miles of lake shoreline than any other state except pos-
sibly Minnesota, and there was an increase in value of riparian lands
because of the demand for campsites and recreational facilities. The
court stated that it would not "disregard such obvious facts."
CI. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 280 App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); State ex
rel. The Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 2o3 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
0427 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1968).
71d. at 217.
81t is not clear what weight these factors had on the court's reasoning, but it
seems the court took judicial notice of these economic realities in finding that
the condemneees had invested in the land. Id. at 217.
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The question presented in Thomas is not new to the law.9 There
is universal agreement among both state and federal courts that a
riparian landowner must be compensated whenever there is an actual
physical encroachment of his land as a result of governmental ac-
tion.I 0 These courts, however, do not agree upon whether there
should be recognized any right of access at all, even ingress and
egress, as a valuable property right and, if so, the extent of that right.
There is a dearth of authority that there is no private right of
access of any type to publicly owned waters and, thus, if the landowner
is deprived of such access as a result of state action there need be no
compensation." Jurisdictions which do recognize the right of access
as a valuable property right nevertheless deny compensation if the
governmental action which deprives the landowner of such a right
is for the purpose of improving navigation.12 The theory behind the
1E.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 949 (1968); Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs,
1O8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Sunapee Dam Co., 7o N.H. 458,
50 A. io8 (igol); Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921); see
2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3 d ed. 1963).
20E.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (igo3); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67
Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Pptr. 401, 409, n.12 (1967), cert. denied, 39o
U.S. 949 (1968); Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933);
Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921); see 2 P. NiCHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.7914(4) (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
21E.g., State v. Sunapee Dam Co., 70 N.H. 458, 50 A. io8 (19O1); Stevens
v. Paterson SL N. R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870); Eisenbach v. Hatfield,
2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891); see A. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 43 (1953); 2 P.
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
1 1E.g., Peck v. Alford Olsen Constr. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131 (1932);
Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1935); Conger v. Pierce
County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921); Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna
Water-Power Co., 9 Wis. 37 o , 61 N.V. 1121 (1895); see 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3d ed. 1963). The federal rule is similar to this but is
called the navigational servitude. It is said that the power to regulate navigation
confers on the United States a dominant servitude which extends to the entire
area below the high water mark. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
The navigational servitude is paramount to all interests derived from the water
and thus there need be no compensation for a deprivation of any right of access.
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (19OO); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269
(1897). It is mentioned in some cases that the servitude is limited to acts done
in aid of navigation. United State v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S.
411 (1926); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W'ash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921). However,
the limits of the doctrine have been extensively expanded and now include the
dumping of sand and silt in a stream which completely blocks all navigation
and the construction of hydroelectric dams. United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.
624 (1961).
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"improving navigation" doctrine is that the private right must yield
in order to gain the highest utility of a public waterway.
13
All of the courts which recognize the private right of access agree
that an obstruction of ingress and egress to bordering waters must
be compensated. 14 However, the overwhelming majority of this group
holds that this right is limited to ingress and egress and does not
further extend into navigable waters.' 5 Thus, in a situation where
a landowner is not prevented from getting in and out of the water
but is denied access to the main body of water as a result of govern-
mental action (as for example, where a low level bridge prevents
passage), these courts hold that there is only a deprivation of the right
of navigation which is held by the public in general.3' Since only
private rights are compensable, there need be no compensation for
the public right of navigation. 17 A 1967 California case, Colberg, Inc.
v. State,ls expanded the rule that deprivation of the right of access
as a result of state action in aid of navigation is not compensable. It
held that the state has the power to deal with its navigable waters
in any manner consistent with the improvement of commercial inter-
course whether in aid of navigation or not.
Some dissatisfaction has been expressed with these doctrinal ap-
proaches which ignore the consequence to a landowner and look pri-
marily to see whether a proper governmental function is being per-
13Sage v. New York, 154 N.Y. 61, 47 N.E. 1o96 (1897). See also Colberg, Inc.
v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S.
949 (1968): "[T]he state, as trustee for the benefit of the people, has power to
deal with its navigable waters in any manner consistent with the improvement
of commercial intercourse, whether navigational or otherwise." 432 P.2d at io,
62 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
14
E.g., Biedler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 Ill. 628, 71 N.E. iii8 (19o4); Natcher v.
City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn.
6o, 148 N.W. 617 (1914).
1E.g., Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, lo8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 A. 8o6 (igoi); Marine
Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 2oi Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per
curiam, 28o App. Div. 1oi, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); State ex rel. The Andersons
v. Masheter, i Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964); Milwaukee Western Fuel Co.
v. City of Milwaukee, 152 Wis. 247, 139 N.W. 540 (1913). Contra, Webb v. Giddens,
82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955). See also United States Gypsum Co. v. Mystic River
Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 13o, io6 N.E.2d 677 (1952) (compensation denied on
common law and constitutional grounds but allowed on basis of a special statute).
See text at note 19, infra.
"6Note 25 infra.
'-Note 25 infra.
"B67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967). In Colberg, a bridge was
constructed across a channel which prevented ships from reaching an upriver
landowner's shipyard. For a discussion on Colberg see 72 DicK. L. REv. 375 (1968);
25 WASH. & LEa L. REv. 323 (1968).
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formed. Two Florida cases, when taken together, seem to depart
from the doctrinal approach and apply a test of fairness. In Webb
v. Giddens,19 a riparian landowner who was in the business of renting
boats was deprived of his right of access to the main body of water
when the state built a bridge across the arm of a lake. The court
concluded that the right of ingress and egress would be meaningless
unless there was also access to the main body of the lake. Yet, in the
later case of Carmazi v. Board of County Commissioner,- a riparian
landowner's right of access to the main body of a river was eliminated
when a bridge was constructed downstream from his property. The
river connected with a bay which now could not be reached by boat.
Compensation was denied. The only damage complained of was lack
of ability to reach the bay by boat with no mention of economic
harm. The court distinguished Webb by saying that riparian rights
are a field of law which is unusually dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. It said the Webb decision was based on
equitable grounds as a result of the unusual facts and circumstances.
Strong dissenting opinions in two leading cases (from California
and Ohio) also manifest a dissatisfaction with the doctrinal approach.
The dissent in Colberg2l called for a test based upon policy considera-
tions instead of strict adherence to a doctrinal approach. If the im-
pairment caused by governmental action is found to be substantial
and peculiar (not the same as that shared by the rest of the public
generally) and compensation can be given without prohibitive costs,
then the injury should be compensable. But if the impairment is
incidental and the cost of compensation is prohibitive, then the land-
owner should not be compensated. In State ex rel. The Andersons v.
Masheter,22 where compensation was denied for an obstruction of
the right of access to the main body of water, the dissent proposed a
"use value" test which would recognize that property owners on
navigable waters may develop a use of the land and water for busi-
ness purposes. Such landowners could establish a use above that en-
joyed by the public in general thus creating a private right and, in
effect, doing away with the "public right of navigation" theory.
The question of how far the right of access extends into navigable
waters had not been resolved in Kentucky before Thomas, the prin-
118a So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955).
'0io8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
1432 P.2d 3, 15-21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 412-19 (1967).
2-1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964). Here, the construction of a highway
bridge prevented grain ships from reaching a riparian landowner's grain terminal.
1969]
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cipal case.23 Thomas did not follow the growing number of juris-
dictions which limit the right of access to only ingress and egress.24
Instead, the right of access was extended to include access to the entire
body of water on which the parcel of land borders. It was contended
by the state that because the land on which the fill was placed was
not the land of condemnees, they had no right to complain.25 This
contention was rejected. The court was aware of contrary lines of
authority and cited excerpts from Colberg. In Colberg, the court
was concerned with how and why the loss of access had occurred while
in Thomas, the court was concerned with the fact that there was a
deprivation of access and that the condemnees had an interest in the
loss. The fact that only the north side was deprived of access to Barkley
Lake did not prevent the court from basing its decision on a different
public policy ground than was followed in Colberg.2 6 In Colberg the
court followed a servitude doctrine the sole object of which is to pro-
tect the demands of modern commerce regardless of the harm to in-
dividual landowners. In Thomas the court looked first at the individ-
ual's investment 27 in the land and then weighed this interest against
the demands of commerce.
The court did not attempt to set up a rigid doctrine. In future
controversies the facts of a particular case will be controlling and not
the "black and white principles" of inflexible decisions. 28 Even though
'An earlier Kentucky case has decided that compensation must be given when
a landowner is deprived of his right of access as a result of state action not in
aid of navigation. Natcher v. City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255
(1936).
21E.g., Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, so8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 20o Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct.
Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 28o App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); State
ex rel. The Andersons v. Masheter, I Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964). See also
United States Gympsum Co. v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 13o, 1o6
N.E.2d 677 (1952) (compensation denied on common law and constitutional
grounds but allowed on basis of a special statute).
-427 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Ky. 1967). The State was apparently trying to persuade
the court to adopt a rule which would allow compensation only where there was
an actual physical encroachment.
OThe demands of modern commerce, the concentration of population in
urban centers fronting on navigable waterways, the achievements of science
in devising new methods of commercial intercourse-all of these factors
require that the state, in determining the means by which the general
welfare is best to be served through the utilization of navigable waters
held in trust for the public, should not be burdened wih [sic] an outmoded
classification favoring one mode of utilization over another.
432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
"The value is there; it is recognized by the buyer, the seller, and everyone
else." 427 S.W.2d at 216.
'72 DICK. L. REV. 375 (1968).
